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G6 Unified Agentic Theory

This document gives a mathematical theory for G6 grounded in the benchmark artifacts under benchmarks/. It is intentionally conservative: no finite benchmark can prove that G6 works for every possible input. What the data can support is a calibrated trust envelope: for a class of tasks whose difficulty, grounding, stakes, verification surface, and distribution shift are measured, G6 can make quantitative promises about expected quality, cost, latency, and escalation.

0. Empirical Basis

The current theory is calibrated against these observed artifacts:

Source Measured signal Relevance
benchmarks/results/benchmark_summary_20260501.json SWE-Bench Pro baseline 27/100, G6 47/100 after repair grading, CI95 (0.370,0.570) for G6 Main evidence that harness structure plus repair changes solve rate
benchmarks/results/t3_run_report_full_20260424.json G6/Claude run 20/100, $70.22 total cost, 8 active theories, 492 theory applications, failure modes dominated by empty patches and patch apply failures Early T3 dynamics and failure-mode concentration
benchmarks/results/t3_run_report_full_20260501.json G6/GPT-5.5 run 44/100, 17 active theories, 5 retired, 228 applications, 362 tool calls, failure codes: F2P_FAIL 97, TIMEOUT 2, EMPTY_PATCH 1 Later T3 dynamics, theory-set growth, and convergence risk
benchmarks/tau2bench_runs/progression_report.json Tau2 sample progression from 3/25 to 18/25 under repeated runs, with t3_only/g6 sometimes improving F1 but not always accuracy Evidence that harness gains are domain- and run-order-dependent
benchmarks/agentharm/results/full_overnight_run.log G6 safety gate accuracy 86.9%, harmful block 98.9%, false negative 1.1%, benign pass 75.0%, McNemar p < 0.05 vs baseline Evidence for high-recall safety gates with false-positive cost
benchmarks/self_train/payments_x402/results/opt_meta_validation.json Optimizers for speed, cost, quality, meta coordination, and bandit outcome recording pass structural validation Evidence that self-optimization primitives exist, not yet end-to-end quality proof
benchmarks/bbeh/README.md and runners BBEH harness compares baseline vs G6 tool-mediated reasoning with pyreason, z3, experta, ctx_ace Evidence for tool-selection formalism
benchmarks/faithfulness_eval.py Faithfulness metric compares generated explanations to retrieved provenance facts and gates at average >= 0.5 Evidence for grounding/faithfulness instrumentation

The theory below distinguishes:

  • Observed facts: numbers directly present in benchmark outputs.
  • Fitted hypotheses: equations that match the observed shape but require more data for stable constants.
  • Design rules: operational policies justified by the theory and current evidence.

1. Core Objects

Let a real-world problem be a tuple:

\[p = (x, D, S, V, R, C)\]

where:

  • x is the user input.
  • D is the latent domain distribution.
  • S is stakes, normalized to [0,1].
  • V is the available verifier set, such as tests, schemas, provers, graders, safety checks, human review, or provenance checks.
  • R is available grounding: documents, code, traces, tools, databases, examples, and prior theories.
  • C is the cost/latency budget.

A G6 harness is:

\[H = (M, P, T, A, G, E, U)\]

where:

  • M is a model or model portfolio.
  • P is the prompt/program policy.
  • T is the tool set.
  • A is the agent/decomposition graph.
  • G is the grounding and retrieval policy.
  • E is the evaluator/verifier stack.
  • U is the update rule for theories, skills, prompts, routing, and HITL gates.

For a task class D, define:

\[ \begin{aligned} Q(H, D) &= \text{expected task utility}\\ L(H, D) &= \text{expected latency}\\ K(H, D) &= \text{expected token and tool cost}\\ E_{\mathrm{risk}}(H, D) &= \text{expected residual risk after verification} \end{aligned} \]

G6 should deploy H only when:

\[ \begin{aligned} Q(H, D) &\ge Q_{\min}(S)\\ L(H, D) &\le L_{\max}\\ K(H, D) &\le K_{\max}\\ E_{\mathrm{risk}}(H, D) &\le \epsilon(S) \end{aligned} \]

This is the central trust envelope.

2. Theory Of Self-Correction Loops

2.1 Failure-Mode Learning

A self-correction loop observes failures, compresses them into reusable theories, and changes future runs. Let:

\[ \begin{aligned} F_t &= \text{empirical failure distribution after iteration } t\\ \Theta_t &= \text{active theory set at iteration } t\\ H_t &= \text{harness induced by } \Theta_t\\ A_t &= \text{accuracy or pass rate of } H_t \end{aligned} \]

Each iteration applies a meta-operator:

\[\Theta_{t+1}, H_{t+1} = U(\Theta_t, H_t, F_t)\]

The benchmark data supports a failure-mode view:

  • April 24 SWE/T3 run: many distinct operational failures, including EMPTY_PATCH, PATCH_APPLY_FAIL, VERIFY_NOT_CALLED, TIMEOUT, and F2P_FAIL.
  • May 1 SWE/T3 run: failure distribution collapses to F2P_FAIL=97, TIMEOUT=2, EMPTY_PATCH=1.

This suggests that early self-correction removes harness/process failures first. After that, remaining errors are mostly irreducible task-solution failures under the current model, tools, budget, and verifier.

2.2 Correction Law

For a fixed task distribution and harness family, model pass rate as:

\[A_t = A_{\infty} - (A_{\infty} - A_0)e^{-\lambda t} - \Delta_{\mathrm{shift}}(t)\]

where:

  • A_0 is base model/harness pass rate.
  • A_inf is the ceiling under current model, tools, and verification.
  • lambda is correction efficiency.
  • Delta_shift(t) is penalty from distribution shift, task ordering, overfitting, or stale theories.

SWE-Bench Pro May 1 gives a measured delta:

\[ \begin{aligned} A_{\mathrm{baseline}} &= 0.27\\ A_{\mathrm{G6,repair}} &= 0.47\\ \Delta &= +0.20 \text{ absolute, } +74\% \text{ relative over baseline} \end{aligned} \]

The confidence interval on G6 is broad, (0.370,0.570), so the useful claim is not "G6 always reaches 47%"; it is "this harness family measured materially above baseline on this n=100 sample after repair grading."

2.3 Theory Size And Compression

Let |Theta| be active theory count, and let B(Theta) be token-equivalent theory size. Let I(D) be task-distribution information needed to solve the sampled domain. Define empirical compression:

\[\rho = \frac{B(\Theta)}{B(\text{observed traces and task contexts})}\]

May 1 SWE/T3 shows:

\[ \begin{aligned} |\Theta| &= 17 \text{ active}\\ \mathrm{retired} &= 5\\ \mathrm{applications} &= 228\\ \mathrm{tool\_calls} &= 362\\ \mathrm{tasks} &= 100 \end{aligned} \]

A useful theory set is therefore much smaller than the trace corpus. The compression is not lossless; it preserves actionable invariants: "call verification", "avoid empty patches", "target failing tests", "handle timeouts", "apply language-specific hygiene".

Hypothesis:

\[|\Theta^*| \approx O\!\left(\frac{H(F)}{h(\theta)}\right)\]

where H(F) is failure-mode entropy and h(theta) is average failure entropy reduced by one reusable theory. When the failure distribution is concentrated, few theories are enough. When failures are diverse or domain-specific, theory count must grow or the system must decompose by subdomain.

2.4 Data Needed For Extrapolation

For a target error tolerance epsilon, confidence 1-delta, and effective hypothesis class size N_H, a conservative PAC-style bound is:

\[n \ge \frac{\log N_H + \log(1/\delta)}{2\epsilon^2}\]

For G6 this is only a starting point because tasks are not IID in practice. Use a corrected sample requirement:

\[n_{\mathrm{required}} = n \cdot D_{\mathrm{shift}} \cdot D_{\mathrm{stakes}} \cdot D_{\mathrm{tail}} \cdot D_{\mathrm{verifier}}\]

where:

  • D_shift >= 1 grows with benchmark-to-production mismatch.
  • D_stakes >= 1 grows with harm severity.
  • D_tail >= 1 grows when rare failure modes matter.
  • D_verifier >= 1 grows when verifiers are weak or subjective.

Rule: do not extrapolate from benchmark to production unless the production domain has a measured embedding/metadata/failure similarity to the benchmark distribution and a live verifier catches the known dominant failure modes.

3. Compression Guarantees For Input And Output Tokens

3.1 Grounding As Information Transfer

Let:

\[ \begin{aligned} Y &= \text{correct output}\\ X &= \text{prompt}\\ R &= \text{retrieved grounding}\\ Z &= \text{model latent state}\\ O &= \text{generated output} \end{aligned} \]

The model can only be trusted for grounded claims when the output-relevant information is present in (X,R) or is already in reliable model prior. A necessary condition is:

\[I(Y; X,R) \ge I_{\mathrm{required}}(Y) - I_{\mathrm{prior}}(M,D)\]

In operational terms:

\[\mathrm{grounding\_coverage} = \frac{\mathrm{supported\_output\_claims}}{\mathrm{total\_verifiable\_output\_claims}}\]

The faithfulness evaluator in benchmarks/faithfulness_eval.py encodes this principle by scoring explanation sentences against retrieved facts and gating average faithfulness at >= 0.5. For production promises, the threshold should depend on stakes:

Stakes Minimum grounding coverage Required action
Low 0.50 Allow with provenance summary
Medium 0.70 Require cited facts and verifier pass
High 0.85 Require independent retrieval or tool proof
Critical 0.95 Require HITL or formal/authoritative verification

3.2 Token Compression Bound

Let R_raw be raw context and R_c be compressed context. Compression is safe for a task if:

\[P(Y \mid X, R_{\mathrm{raw}}) \approx P(Y \mid X, R_c)\]

Define information loss:

\[\mathrm{Loss}_c = D_{\mathrm{KL}}\!\left(P(Y \mid X,R_{\mathrm{raw}})\ \Vert\ P(Y \mid X,R_c)\right)\]

A compression policy is acceptable only when:

\[\mathrm{Loss}_c \le \epsilon_c(S)\]

Because Loss_c is not directly observable, G6 estimates it using:

  • verifier disagreement,
  • missing citation rate,
  • answer instability under retrieval perturbation,
  • failure of independent smaller/larger model checks,
  • human rejection rate,
  • regression tests or task graders.

Practical bound:

\[ \mathrm{trust}(O) \le \min\!\left( \begin{array}{l} \mathrm{verifier\_confidence},\\ \mathrm{grounding\_coverage},\\ \mathrm{retrieval\_recall\_estimate},\\ \mathrm{calibration\_score\_for\_domain} \end{array} \right) \]

Output token length is also a compression decision. For a required output Y, the useful output size is the minimal description length:

\[L^*(Y \mid X,R,V) = \min \left\{\mathrm{length}(\mathrm{program\ or\ explanation}) : V \text{ accepts}\right\}\]

G6 should optimize for L*, not for shortest response. Too-short outputs omit necessary warrants; too-long outputs increase hallucination surface and review cost.

4. Theory Of Self-Optimization

4.1 Objective

G6 optimization is multi-objective:

\[ \begin{aligned} \mathrm{maximize}\quad &\mathbb{E}[\mathrm{utility}]\\ \mathrm{minimize}\quad &\mathrm{token\_cost} + \mathrm{tool\_cost} + \mathrm{latency} + \mathrm{review\_cost} + \mathrm{residual\_risk}\\ \mathrm{subject\ to}\quad &\mathrm{verifier\ and\ safety\ constraints} \end{aligned} \]

Define net value:

\[ \begin{aligned} NV(H,p) &= V_{\mathrm{task}} \cdot P_{\mathrm{success}}(H,p) - C_{\mathrm{tokens}}(H,p) - C_{\mathrm{tools}}(H,p)\\ &\quad - C_{\mathrm{latency}}(H,p) - C_{\mathrm{HITL}}(H,p) - C_{\mathrm{risk}}(H,p) \end{aligned} \]

The optimizer should select the cheapest harness whose residual risk is below the stakes threshold:

\[ \begin{aligned} H^* &= \arg\min_H \mathrm{Cost}(H,p)\\ \mathrm{subject\ to}\quad &P_{\mathrm{success}}(H,p) \ge q_{\min}(S)\\ &E_{\mathrm{risk}}(H,p) \le \epsilon(S) \end{aligned} \]

4.2 Empirical State

opt_meta_validation.json shows that speed, cost, quality, meta coordination, and UCB1 outcome recording pass structural validation. That is evidence that the optimization substrate exists. It is not yet proof that the optimizer improves task success end to end.

Therefore the theory treats self-optimization as a bandit with constraints:

\[ \begin{aligned} \mathrm{arm} &= \text{harness variant}\\ \mathrm{reward} &= \text{task utility} - \text{normalized cost} - \text{normalized latency} - \text{risk penalty}\\ \mathrm{constraint} &= \mathrm{verifier\_pass} \land \mathrm{safety\_pass} \end{aligned} \]

Use constrained UCB:

\[\mathrm{score}_i = \mathrm{mean\_reward}_i + \alpha\sqrt{\frac{\log N}{n_i}} - \beta\,\mathrm{risk}_i - \gamma\,\mathrm{cost}_i\]

Do not allow exploration to bypass safety or high-stakes review.

4.3 Trust Decision

For a production answer, compute:

\[T = \mathrm{calibrated\_trust} = P(\mathrm{correct} \mid \mathrm{features})\]

Features should include:

  • benchmark class match,
  • model identity and size,
  • prompt/harness version,
  • number of decomposition nodes,
  • verification outcome,
  • grounding coverage,
  • debate/critic agreement,
  • failure-mode similarity,
  • cost/latency anomalies,
  • safety tier,
  • historical human override rate.

Action policy:

  • If \(T \ge \tau_{\mathrm{auto}}(S)\), return the answer.
  • If \(T \ge \tau_{\mathrm{hitl}}(S)\), require human review.
  • Otherwise refuse, ask for more grounding, or escalate to a stronger harness.

5. Theory Of Supervision And Smaller-Model Offload

5.1 Capability-Risk Routing

A subtask s may be offloaded to a smaller model m_small if:

\[ \begin{aligned} P_{\mathrm{success}}(m_{\mathrm{small}},s) - P_{\mathrm{success}}(m_{\mathrm{large}},s) &\ge -\eta(S)\\ E_{\mathrm{risk}}(m_{\mathrm{small}},s) &\le \epsilon(S)\\ \mathrm{verifier\_strength}(s) &\ge v_{\min}(S) \end{aligned} \]

That means smaller models are suitable when:

  • the task is low stakes,
  • output is easy to verify,
  • the domain is close to the smaller model's training distribution,
  • the failure modes are known and cheap to catch,
  • the subtask output is intermediate and can be discarded or repaired.

They are not suitable for:

  • final high-stakes judgments,
  • irreversible actions,
  • weakly verified legal/medical/security/financial claims,
  • ambiguous user intent,
  • tasks with severe distribution shift,
  • tasks where the smaller model's errors poison later context.

5.2 Supervision Graph

Let a multi-model harness be a directed acyclic graph:

\[A = (N, E)\]

Each node i has model m_i, cost c_i, latency l_i, risk r_i, and verifier v_i.

The supervisor chooses the cheapest node assignment such that every path to final output is verified:

\[ \begin{aligned} \min\quad &\sum_i c_i\\ \mathrm{subject\ to}\quad &\text{all final claims have a verifying path}\\ &\mathrm{path\_risk} \le \epsilon(S) \end{aligned} \]

Design rule:

  • Small models draft, classify, retrieve, summarize, format, and run low-risk checks.
  • Strong models plan, resolve ambiguity, handle cross-domain synthesis, and adjudicate high-impact decisions.
  • Deterministic tools verify wherever possible.
  • Humans supervise when the verifier is weak and stakes are high.

6. Theory Of Necessary Decomposition

6.1 Why Decompose

A task should be decomposed when its complexity exceeds the reliable working bandwidth of one model call:

\[B_{\mathrm{task}} > B_{\mathrm{model,effective}}\]

where:

\[B_{\mathrm{task}} = B_{\mathrm{domain}} + B_{\mathrm{state}} + B_{\mathrm{search}} + B_{\mathrm{verification}} + B_{\mathrm{stakes}}\]

and B_model_effective is smaller than the nominal context window because attention, retrieval, and reasoning degrade before the hard limit.

6.2 Decomposition Depth

Let:

  • b = branching factor,
  • d = necessary reasoning depth,
  • q_i = probability node i is correct,
  • v_i = verifier catch probability at node i,
  • c_i = cost of node i.

Expected final error under independent node errors with verification is approximately:

\[P_{\mathrm{error}} \le 1 - \prod_i \left(1 - e_i(1 - v_i)\right)\]

where e_i = 1 - q_i.

Decomposition helps when it raises q_i or v_i enough to offset extra nodes:

\[\Delta_{\mathrm{quality}}(\mathrm{decompose}) > \Delta_{\mathrm{error\_propagation}} + \Delta_{\mathrm{cost}}\]

Maximum useful decomposition is reached when marginal utility is non-positive:

\[MU(k) = Q(k+1) - Q(k) - \lambda_{\mathrm{cost}}\!\left(C(k+1)-C(k)\right) - \lambda_{\mathrm{latency}}\!\left(L(k+1)-L(k)\right) \le 0\]

6.3 G6 Decomposition Policy

Use these default decomposition levels:

Class Examples Nodes
Atomic formatting, simple retrieval, deterministic transform 1
Simple verified one code change, one factual answer with sources 2-3
Moderate multi-file change, research synthesis, workflow automation 4-8
Complex ambiguous architecture, multi-system debugging, high-stakes analysis 8-20
Critical legal/medical/security/financial irreversible decisions 20+ plus HITL

Every decomposition should include:

  • planner,
  • executor(s),
  • verifier(s),
  • risk gate,
  • synthesis node,
  • trace/audit record.

7. Theory Of Debate

7.1 When Debate Helps

Debate is useful when errors are at least partially independent:

\[\mathrm{corr}(\mathrm{error}_i,\mathrm{error}_j) < \rho_{\max}\]

If two agents share the same model, prompt, context, and blind spot, debate can become repeated self-confirmation. Use diversity when the likely failure is conceptual, normative, or domain-specific.

Debate is less useful when:

  • a deterministic verifier exists,
  • the answer is directly testable,
  • all debaters share the same missing evidence,
  • stakes require authority rather than opinion.

7.2 Debate Reliability

For n independent critics with individual error rate e, majority-vote error is:

\[P_{\mathrm{majority\_error}} = \sum_{k=\lceil(n+1)/2\rceil}^{n} {n \choose k} e^k(1-e)^{n-k}\]

With correlated errors, use effective agent count:

\[n_{\mathrm{eff}} = \frac{n}{1 + (n-1)\rho}\]

where rho is pairwise error correlation. This is why three diverse agents can beat five near-identical ones.

7.3 Debate Protocol

Default G6 debate:

  1. Independent solve: agents answer without seeing each other.
  2. Evidence lock: each answer must cite grounding, tests, or assumptions.
  3. Cross-critique: agents attack the strongest opposing answer.
  4. Adjudication: supervisor chooses using verifier outcomes first, arguments second.
  5. Residual-risk statement: unresolved disagreement becomes HITL or stronger harness.

Use same-model self-critique for low-stakes cheap error checks. Use different models or model families for high-ambiguity tasks where correlated blind spots matter.

8. Theory Of Pretraining Versus G6 Metaharness Scaling

8.1 Neural Scaling

A standard neural scaling approximation is:

\[\mathrm{Loss}(N,D,C) = L_{\infty} + aN^{-\alpha} + bD^{-\beta} + cC^{-\gamma}\]

where N is parameters, D is pretraining data, and C is compute.

This improves latent capability but does not guarantee:

  • correct tool use,
  • task-specific decomposition,
  • grounding provenance,
  • production safety gates,
  • cost-aware routing,
  • human escalation,
  • self-repair from local failures.

8.2 Metaharness Scaling

G6 adds an outer loop:

\[\mathrm{Performance} = f(\mathrm{model\_capability}, \mathrm{grounding}, \mathrm{tools}, \mathrm{decomposition}, \mathrm{verification}, \mathrm{theories}, \mathrm{supervision})\]

A useful approximation:

\[ \begin{aligned} \mathrm{logit}(A_{\mathrm{G6}}) &= \mathrm{logit}(A_{\mathrm{model}}) + \beta_g G + \beta_t T + \beta_v V\\ &\quad + \beta_d D_{\mathrm{cmp}} + \beta_{\theta}\Theta - \beta_{\mathrm{shift}}\mathrm{Shift} - \beta_{\mathrm{cost}}\mathrm{BudgetPressure} \end{aligned} \]

The May 1 SWE result (0.27 -> 0.47) is evidence that harness terms can add substantial performance without changing base pretraining. The AgentHarm result is evidence that safety-gate structure can drastically improve harmful block rate (14.8% -> 98.9%) while worsening benign pass rate (87.5% -> 75.0%), showing the harness changes the operating point, not just raw intelligence.

8.3 Differential Scaling Claim

Neural scaling gives broad latent competence. G6 scaling gives targeted reliability over a measured domain. The differential advantage of G6 is largest when:

  • failures are systematic and compressible,
  • verifiers are available,
  • tools add information the model lacks,
  • tasks can be decomposed,
  • production risk needs explicit gates,
  • repeated failures can be converted into theories.

The advantage is smallest when:

  • the task has no useful verifier,
  • the domain is entirely novel,
  • relevant information is absent,
  • success requires latent knowledge unavailable to all models/tools,
  • the cost of decomposition exceeds task value.

9. Theory Of Multi-Agent Systems And Agentic Amdahl's Law

9.1 Agentic Amdahl's Law

Classical Amdahl:

\[\mathrm{speedup} \le \frac{1}{s + (1-s)/p}\]

Agentic work has extra overhead:

\[ \mathrm{speedup}_{\mathrm{agentic}} \le \frac{1}{ s + (1-s)/p_{\mathrm{eff}} + O_{\mathrm{coord}} + O_{\mathrm{context}} + O_{\mathrm{verify}} + O_{\mathrm{merge}} + O_{\mathrm{rework}} } \]

where:

  • s is inherently sequential fraction.
  • p_eff is effective parallel agents after error correlation and resource contention.
  • O_coord is planning/coordination overhead.
  • O_context is cost of giving each agent enough context.
  • O_verify is checking cost.
  • O_merge is integration cost.
  • O_rework is expected repair cost from inconsistent outputs.

Parallelization helps when:

\[\mathrm{parallel\_work\_saved} > \mathrm{coordination} + \mathrm{context} + \mathrm{verification} + \mathrm{merge} + \mathrm{rework}\]

9.2 Sequential Versus Parallel Policy

Run in parallel when subtasks are:

  • independent,
  • have disjoint write surfaces,
  • have clear acceptance tests,
  • have low shared-state coupling,
  • are bottlenecked by wall-clock time rather than shared context.

Run sequentially when:

  • later work depends on earlier discoveries,
  • context must be globally consistent,
  • integration errors are expensive,
  • the task has one critical path,
  • safety review must gate each step.

9.3 Optimal G6 Multi-Agent Design

The default design is:

  1. Supervisor
  2. Planner
  3. Parallel specialists where independence is high
  4. Verifier/critic layer
  5. Integrator
  6. Safety/HITL gate
  7. Trace and theory update

The supervisor should track:

\[\mathrm{agent\_value}_i = \mathrm{marginal\_quality}_i - \mathrm{marginal\_cost}_i - \mathrm{marginal\_coordination}_i\]

Spawn another agent only if agent_value_i > 0 and the new agent does not increase risk beyond the stakes threshold.

10. Formalizing G6 End To End

10.1 G6 Runtime Contract

For each task, G6 should emit a runtime contract:

task_class: ...
benchmark_match: ...
stakes: ...
model_route: ...
decomposition_graph: ...
grounding_sources: ...
verifiers: ...
confidence: ...
residual_risk: ...
cost_budget: ...
latency_budget: ...
hitl_policy: ...
known_failure_modes: ...
sla_class: ...

The final answer is valid only with this contract.

10.2 SLA Classes

SLA Conditions Promise
Exploratory weak grounding or no verifier Best effort, no correctness guarantee
Assisted benchmark-adjacent, some verifier Calibrated confidence plus trace
Verified strong verifier and grounding Output accepted if verifier passes
Supervised high stakes or weak verifier Human approval required
Refused unacceptable residual risk No autonomous completion

10.3 Stability Over Time

G6 is stable only if it monitors drift:

\[ \begin{aligned} \mathrm{Drift}_t &= \mathrm{distance}(\mathrm{current\_tasks}, \mathrm{benchmark\_distribution})\\ \mathrm{FailureDrift}_t &= \mathrm{distance}(\mathrm{current\_failures}, \mathrm{known\_failure\_modes})\\ \mathrm{CalibrationDrift}_t &= |\mathrm{predicted\_confidence} - \mathrm{observed\_success}| \end{aligned} \]

Trigger retraining or harness review when:

\[ \mathrm{Drift}_t > \tau_D \quad\lor\quad \mathrm{FailureDrift}_t > \tau_F \quad\lor\quad \mathrm{CalibrationDrift}_t > \tau_C \quad\lor\quad \mathrm{SLA\ breach\ rate} > \tau_{\mathrm{SLA}} \]

The May 1 T3 failure collapse to mostly F2P_FAIL is a positive stability sign for process errors, but it also shows the next bottleneck: domain-solving quality and verification depth.

11. General Meta-Algorithm

Input: task \(p=(x,D,S,V,R,C)\), benchmark registry \(B\), theory store \(\Theta\).

  1. Classify the task: estimate difficulty \(d\), stakes \(S\), domain \(D\), verifier strength \(V\), and grounding gap \(G_{\mathrm{gap}}\).
  2. Match to the benchmark envelope: compute similarity to measured benchmark classes; if similarity is low, downgrade the SLA or require exploratory mode.
  3. Select the harness: choose model route, tools, decomposition graph, and HITL policy while minimizing expected cost subject to risk and quality constraints.
  4. Ground the run: retrieve evidence until marginal grounding gain is less than or equal to marginal cost, then enforce the grounding threshold based on stakes.
  5. Execute: run planner/executor agents and parallelize only independent nodes with clear merge contracts.
  6. Verify: apply tests, schemas, formal tools, faithfulness checks, safety gates, and critics; estimate residual risk from verifier strength and known failure modes.
  7. Decide: auto-return, require HITL, escalate to a stronger harness, ask for more data, or refuse.
  8. Learn: classify failures, update theory strengths, retire weak or stale theories, and record cost, latency, confidence, verifier outcomes, and human overrides.

Default parameters, pending further calibration:

Parameter Default Meaning
tau_auto(low) 0.80 auto-answer threshold for low stakes
tau_auto(medium) 0.90 auto-answer threshold for medium stakes
tau_auto(high) 0.97 auto-answer threshold for high stakes with strong verifier
tau_auto(critical) disabled critical tasks require HITL/formal authority
grounding_low 0.50 minimum provenance coverage
grounding_medium 0.70 minimum provenance coverage
grounding_high 0.85 minimum provenance coverage
grounding_critical 0.95 minimum provenance coverage
theory_retire_threshold 0.20 retire theory below this strength
max_unverified_decomp_nodes 0 every decomposition node needs some verifier
debate_rounds_default 2 solve + critique
agent_spawn_threshold positive marginal value spawn only when expected value is positive

12. Logic Error Checklist

Use this checklist to audit future G6 designs:

  • Does the claimed SLA refer to a measured benchmark envelope?
  • Is benchmark-to-production distribution shift measured?
  • Is the final answer grounded, or does it rely on model prior?
  • Is the compression policy checked against output claim coverage?
  • Are high-stakes claims routed to stronger verification or HITL?
  • Are smaller models only used where their outputs are verified or low stakes?
  • Is decomposition reducing complexity, or just adding coordination cost?
  • Are debate agents independent enough to reduce correlated error?
  • Are safety gates evaluated for both false negatives and false positives?
  • Are theories being retired when stale or weak?
  • Are confidence estimates calibrated against observed outcomes?
  • Is production drift monitored before making formal promises?

13. What Can Be Promised Now

Based on current data, G6 can credibly promise:

  • Harnesses can improve measured task performance over baseline in some domains, as SWE-Bench Pro shows 27% -> 47% after repair grading.
  • Safety gates can greatly increase harmful-prompt refusal, as AgentHarm shows 14.8% -> 98.9% harmful-prompt refusal rate, with a known benign false-positive tradeoff.
  • Failure modes are compressible into a small active theory set for software-repair tasks, as T3 shows 17 active theories and concentrated residual failures.
  • The system can expose cost, latency, tool-use, verifier, grounding, and theory-application traces needed for SLA accounting.

G6 cannot honestly promise:

  • correctness for arbitrary unseen inputs,
  • safety without false positives,
  • benchmark performance under arbitrary distribution shift,
  • trustworthy high-stakes answers without strong grounding and verification,
  • gains from multi-agent decomposition when subtasks are tightly coupled,
  • gains from debate when agents share the same blind spot.

The mathematically sound promise is conditional:

For task class \(D\), stakes \(S\), verifier set \(V\), grounding \(R\), and harness \(H\), G6 may claim SLA level \(L\) only if observed calibration on benchmark-adjacent tasks, online verifier outcomes, drift metrics, and residual-risk estimates all satisfy the thresholds for \(L\).

That is the core theory: G6 is not a universal correctness machine. It is a measured, self-correcting, cost-aware, verifier-governed harness that can convert empirical traces into bounded operational promises.

Additional Artifacts